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OR THIRTY YEARS, international human rights litigation in 
U.S. courts has developed with little attention to a lurking 
doctrinal objection to the entire enterprise. The paradigm 
international human rights case involves a suit against a 
foreign government official for alleged abuses committed abroad 
under color of state law. A potentially dispositive objection to this 
litigation is foreign sovereign immunity. The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) creates presumptive immunity for foreign 
states and has no exception that would cover human rights cases. 
Many courts have assumed that the FSIA has no relevance to human 
rights suits as long as they are directed against state officials rather 
than the state itself. Recently, however, courts have begun to reject 
this assumption, and the issue is now before the Supreme Court in 
Yousuf v. Samantar.1 
This essay makes two contributions to the debate over whether 
the FSIA applies to suits against individual foreign officials. First, it 
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1 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, No. 08-1555 (Sept. 30, 2009).  
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shows that, contrary to what some courts have assumed, suits 
against individual officials fall naturally within the plain language of 
the FSIA’s immunity provisions. Second, it shows that the interna-
tional law of state immunity, which is relevant to the proper inter-
pretation of the FSIA in several ways, supports this construction. 
Combining these and other points, the essay concludes that the 
FSIA confers presumptive immunity in suits against state officials, 
including former state officials, for their official acts committed 
while in office, and that this immunity applies even in human rights 
cases. 
BACKGROUND 
nternational human rights litigation in U.S. courts can be traced 
to the Second Circuit’s 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.2 
The court in Filartiga held that Paraguayan citizens could sue a for-
mer Paraguayan police inspector for allegedly torturing and killing a 
member of their family in Paraguay, in violation of international 
law. In support of this holding, the court relied on the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), a then-obscure provision that had originally been 
part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789. The ATS provides that “[t]he 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.”3  
Since Filartiga, plaintiffs from around the globe have relied on 
the ATS to sue in U.S. courts for human rights abuses. In many of 
these suits, as in Filartiga, a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign official for 
an alleged violation of international law committed on foreign soil. 
The allegation of governmental conduct is often a necessary com-
ponent of the plaintiff’s case, since most violations of international 
law require state action.4 Because governments act through indi-
viduals, these suits in effect challenge the conduct of foreign gov-
                                                                                                
2 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
4 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 & cmt. b (1987).  
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ernments. As a result, the sovereign immunity of these govern-
ments is a potentially serious obstacle to this litigation. 
Courts in the United States have long accorded foreign nations 
immunity from suit. Before 1976, they did so as a matter of com-
mon law, taking into account considerations of international law 
and comity. In addition, starting in the late 1930s, courts began to 
give essentially absolute deference to Executive Branch views on 
whether immunity should be granted. Courts also accepted and ap-
plied the Executive Branch’s determination in 1952, in the Tate 
Letter, that the United States would henceforth apply the “restric-
tive” theory of immunity, whereby foreign sovereigns could be sued 
for their private, commercial acts, but not their public, sovereign 
acts.5 
In 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA, a statute that purported to 
codify the international law of sovereign immunity, including the 
restrictive theory, and to move immunity determinations from the 
Executive Branch to the courts. The FSIA provides that a “foreign 
state,” including a state’s “agency or instrumentality,” is immune 
from suit in U.S. courts unless the suit falls within one of the FSIA’s 
specified exceptions to immunity.6 Importantly, the FSIA’s general 
tort exception is limited to situations in which the damage or injury 
occurs in the United States.7 In 1996, Congress added an exception 
for certain egregious acts committed abroad, but the exception ap-
plies only to a few “state sponsor[s] of terrorism.”8 As a result, the 
FSIA appears to contain no exception for international human rights 
cases. 
It is unclear from the text of the FSIA whether it covers suits, 
like the suit against the police inspector in Filartiga, against individ-
ual officials. The court in Filartiga did not address the issue, even 
                                                                                                
5 See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983) 
(describing history recounted in this paragraph). 
6 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603-04. 
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 
8 The “state sponsor of terrorism” exception currently applies to suits against four 
states: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. For the latest iteration of this exception, see 
28 U.S.C. § 1605A. 
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though the international law violation in that case – torture – re-
quired government action. Many of the post-Filartiga human rights 
decisions have similarly failed to consider the issue of immunity. 
Outside the human rights context, the Ninth Circuit held in an 
influential 1990 decision, Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, that 
suits against individual officers for actions taken in an official capac-
ity are covered by the FSIA.9 That case involved a suit by a Philip-
pine citizen against a member of a Philippine governmental com-
mission charged with recovering wealth allegedly absconded by the 
Marcos regime. Noting that foreign officials received common law 
immunity before enactment of the FSIA, the court reasoned that it 
would be “illogical” to think that Congress in the FSIA eliminated 
the application of sovereign immunity to individuals “implicitly and 
without comment.” The court added that “to allow unrestricted 
suits against individual foreign officials acting in their official capaci-
ties . . . [would allow] litigants to accomplish indirectly what the 
Act barred them from doing directly,” and “would defeat the pur-
poses of the Act.” It concluded that individual officials who act on 
behalf of the state can reasonably be considered “agencies or in-
strumentalities” of the state for purposes of the FSIA. 
Most circuit courts to have addressed this issue have agreed with 
Chuidian.10 In recent years, however, two circuit courts have staked 
out a contrary view. The Seventh Circuit has noted that the FSIA 
defines “agency or instrumentality” as a “separate legal person,” a 
phrase that “refers to a legal fiction – a business entity which is a 
legal person.”11 It added that “[i]f Congress meant to include indi-
viduals acting in the official capacity in the scope of the FSIA, it 
would have done so in clear and unmistakable terms.” The Fourth 
Circuit in Yousuf agreed with these points, and also noted that indi-
                                                                                                
9 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). 
10 See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d 
Cir. 2008); Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 
2002); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho, 182 F.3d 380, 388-
89 (5th Cir. 1999); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996).  
11 Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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viduals do not easily fit within the FSIA’s jurisdictional and service 
of process provisions for an “agency or instrumentality.”12  
MOVING BEYOND 
“AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY” 
e agree with those courts that have concluded that suits 
against individual foreign officials are not easily accommo-
dated within the “agency or instrumentality” language of the FSIA. 
There is, however, a better textual basis for applying the FSIA: 
these suits can be considered to be directed against the foreign state 
itself for purposes of the FSIA.13 Since a state acts through individu-
als, a suit against an individual official for actions carried out on be-
half of the state is in reality a suit against the foreign state, even if 
that is not how the plaintiff captions his or her complaint. This ap-
proach is consistent with the FSIA’s definition of “foreign state,” 
which does not purport to be comprehensive, but rather simply 
“includes” various entities, including agencies and instrumentali-
ties.14 
A number of courts have gestured towards this approach even 
though they have ultimately rested their decisions on the FSIA’s 
“agency or instrumentality” language. In Chuidian, for example, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that “a suit against an individual acting in his 
official capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against the sover-
eign directly.”15 More recently, the Second Circuit observed that “a 
claim against an agency of state power, including a state officer act-
                                                                                                
12 552 F.3d at 380-82.  
13 See Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Officials and Sovereign Immunity in U.S. Courts, ASIL 
INSIGHT (Mar. 17, 2009), www.asil.org/insights090317.cfm. 
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (“[a] foreign state . . . includes” listed entities) (emphasis 
added). This approach is also consistent with the FSIA’s exception to immunity 
for tort claims, which, in allowing a foreign state to be sued when an employee of 
the state commits a tort within the United States “while acting within the scope of 
his office or employment,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5), recognizes that a tort com-
mitted by a state official can be an act of the state. 
15 Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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ing in his official capacity, can be in effect a claim against the 
state.”16 
Treating a suit against a state officer for his official acts as a suit 
against the state itself is also consistent with the pre-FSIA common 
law of immunity. Over a century ago, the Second Circuit ex-
plained: “[B]ecause the acts of the official representatives of the state 
are those of the state itself, when exercised within the scope of their 
delegated powers, courts and publicists have recognized the immu-
nity of public agents from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts 
done within their own states in the exercise of the sovereignty 
thereof.”17 The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, published in 1965, similarly concluded that, under the 
common law, a foreign state’s sovereign immunity extended to a 
“minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts per-
formed in his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction 
would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.”18  
This common law backdrop is significant. As a statute that regu-
lates in the area of the common law, the FSIA should “be read with 
a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and famil-
iar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is 
evident.”19 Nothing in the FSIA, however, suggests an intent to 
withdraw the immunity that the common law would have granted 
in suits against foreign officials. Taking account of the proper com-
mon law backdrop is particularly significant in cases brought under 
the ATS – the principal statutory vehicle for international human 
rights cases – since the ATS does not even create a statutory cause 
                                                                                                
16 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 84 (2d Cir. 2008).  
17 Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aff’d on other grounds, 168 
U.S. 250 (1897); see also 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW § 179 (1906) (collecting authorities from the late 1700s through Underhill). 
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 66(f) (1965); see also Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 504 (2d 
Cir. 1971) (endorsing this provision of the Restatement). 
19 Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); see also Matar v. Dichter, 
563 F.3d 9, 13-14 (2d Cir. 2009) (making this point). 
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of action but rather has been construed as delegating limited com-
mon law authority to the courts.20 
Treating official capacity suits brought against individual officials 
as suits against the state is also consistent with, and indeed required 
by, the international law of sovereign immunity. As Hazel Fox, a 
leading expert on foreign sovereign immunity, explains, “any act 
performed by the individual as an act of the State enjoys the immu-
nity which the State enjoys.”21 Many courts around the world have 
concluded that the international law of foreign sovereign immunity 
applies to suits against officials acting in an official capacity.22 This 
conclusion is also reflected in the UN Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property, which includes within its 
definition of the “state” that is entitled to immunity “representatives 
of the State acting in that capacity.”23 
Courts outside the United States have interpreted their domestic 
foreign sovereign immunity laws in light of this international law 
principle even when those laws were unclear on the point. For ex-
ample, the United Kingdom State Immunity Act of 1978, like the 
FSIA, makes the “State” presumptively immune from the jurisdic-
tion of domestic courts subject to discrete exceptions, but also like 
                                                                                                
20 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713, 721 (2004) (construing the ATS 
as “strictly jurisdictional” but as nevertheless “underwrit[ing] litigation of a nar-
row set of common law actions derived from the law of nations”). 
21 HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 455 (2d ed. 2008); see also, e.g., 1 
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1996). 
22 See, e.g., Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] 
UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270, at para. 10 (United Kingdom); Schmidt v. Home 
Secretary of the Government of the United Kingdom [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. 301, 
(1994) 103 I.L.R. 322, 323-325 (Ireland); Jaffe v. Miller [1993] 13 O.R.3d 745, 
758-59 (Canada); Church of Scientology Case (1978) 65 I.L.R. 193, 198 (Ger-
many); see also Mizushima Tomonori, The Individual as Beneficiary of State Immunity: 
Problems of the Attribution of Ultra Vires Conduct, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 261, 
274 (2001) (“The vast majority of cases in various jurisdictions have recognized 
the individual as a beneficiary of state immunity.”). 
23 See UN Convention, art. 2(1)(b)(iv), G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/59/38/Annex (Dec. 16, 2004). 
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the FSIA does not expressly include within its definition of the term 
“State” government officials acting in an official capacity. Nonethe-
less, the British House of Lords, relying on settled international 
law, interpreted “State” to include “servants or agents, officials or 
functionaries of a foreign state” acting in an official capacity.24  
International law, like the common law, is a significant consid-
eration when construing the FSIA. Under the Charming Betsy canon, 
courts have long construed federal statutes, where possible, not to 
violate international law.25 In the absence of any relevant exception, 
the United States would violate international law if it failed to con-
fer immunity on state officials for their official acts committed while 
in office. Moreover, a well-recognized purpose of the FSIA was 
“codification of international law [of immunity] at the time of the 
FSIA’s enactment.”26 Both in 1976 and today, international law con-
fers immunity in suits brought against individual officers for their 
official acts. 
FORMER OFFICIALS 
nce it is established that the FSIA applies to suits against indi-
vidual state officers who act in an official capacity, the next 
question is whether the FSIA applies to suits brought against these 
officers after they leave office with respect to the official acts they 
carried out while in office. 
In Yousuf, the Fourth Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,27 concluded that the FSIA does 
not apply to suits against former officials. The question in Dole Food 
was whether a corporation’s status as state-owned for purposes of 
the “agency or instrumentality” portion of the FSIA’s definition of 
“foreign state” should be determined at the time of the underlying 
                                                                                                
24 See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at para 10; see also, e.g., Jaffe 
v. Miller, supra note 22, at 759 (interpreting Canada’s immunity statute). 
25 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
26 Permanent Mission of India to the UN v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199 
(2007). 
27 538 U.S. 468 (2003). 
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activity or at the time of the lawsuit. The FSIA defines an agency or 
instrumentality to include an entity “a majority of whose shares or 
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political 
subdivision thereof.” The Supreme Court concluded from this pre-
sent-tense phrasing that “instrumentality status [must] be deter-
mined at the time suit is filed.” The Fourth Circuit in Yousuf rea-
soned that the status of an individual defendant under the FSIA 
should similarly be determined at the time of the lawsuit.28 
There are reasons to question the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on 
Dole Food. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Belhas v. Ya’alon, which 
involved a suit brought against a retired Israeli general, Dole Food 
focused on state corporations rather than state officials, and these 
two classes of defendants implicate different issues.29 “While the 
state may own corporations that conduct some of [its official] acts, 
it need not do so,” explained the D.C. Circuit, whereas “individual 
officials or agents must act as instrumentalities for anything actually 
to be done.” As a result, “[t]o suppose that the sovereign’s immu-
nity protecting the individual official in the performance of his sov-
ereign’s business vanishes the moment he resigns, retires, or loses 
an election is to establish that he had no immunity at all.” The D.C. 
Circuit added that the comity aims of the FSIA are fully implicated 
in a suit against a former official, because “[t]o allow the resignation 
of an official involved in the adoption of policies underlying a deci-
sion or in the implementation of such decision to repeal his immu-
nity would destroy, not enhance that comity.” 
While we find the D.C. Circuit’s policy arguments persuasive, 
at bottom the debate between the Fourth and D.C. Circuits about 
the meaning of Dole Food assumes that the question of immunity for 
former officials turns on how individuals are assimilated into the 
“agency or instrumentality” language in the FSIA. If immunity in 
suits against officials flows from the immunity of the state itself, 
however, then Dole Food does not come in to play, and there should 
be no distinction between current and former officials, because the 
                                                                                                
28 552 F.3d at 381-83. 
29 See 515 F.3d 1279, 1284-86 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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state’s immunity would encompass all official acts, regardless of 
whether the individuals who carried out the acts happen to be in 
office at the time of the litigation.  
This reading of the FSIA is consistent with the international law 
of state immunity, which provides former officials with immunity 
for official acts taken while in office.30 International law distin-
guishes between state immunity based on status (ratione personae) 
and state immunity based on acts (ratione materiae). Status immu-
nity attaches to select important offices, such as heads of state and 
diplomats. This immunity extends even to acts carried out before 
the official took office or committed in a personal capacity while in 
office, but such immunity terminates with the office. Act immunity, 
by contrast, is broader in applying to every government official, 
both during and after their time in office, but also narrower in ap-
plying only to the individual’s official acts. It is this act immunity that 
applies in a suit against a former official, something that the Fourth 
Circuit failed to recognize. 
In Matar v. Dichter, which involved a suit against the former head 
of the Israeli security agency for alleged war crimes, the Second 
Circuit correctly noted that “an immunity based on acts – rather 
than status – does not depend on tenure in office.”31 But the court 
elided the debate between the D.C. and Fourth Circuits about 
whether former officials are covered by the “agency or instrumen-
tality” language of the FSIA, reasoning that “whether the FSIA ap-
plies to former officials or not, they continue to enjoy immunity 
under common law.” The court noted that the pre-FSIA common 
law recognized individual official immunity for acts performed in an 
official capacity. It added that during that period courts deferred to 
suggestions of immunity from the Executive Branch, and that the 
                                                                                                
30 See, e.g., DRAFT ARTICLES ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR 
PROPERTY, WITH COMMENTARIES 18 (1991), at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts 
/instruments/english/commentaries/4_1_1991.pdf; R v. Bow St. Magistrate, 
Ex parte Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.) (U.K.) (Millet, L.J.), reprinted in 
38 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 581, 644-45 (1999). 
31 563 F.3d at 14. 
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Executive Branch in that case had urged the district court to apply 
immunity. 
In our view, Matar marks an unfortunate return to the pre-FSIA 
common law regime of executive discretion in determining foreign 
sovereign immunity – a regime characterized by unprincipled con-
ferrals of immunity based on the political preferences of the presi-
dential administration and case-by-case diplomatic pressures.32 
Courts have continued to apply this pre-FSIA regime in a few cases 
involving heads of state,33 but Matar’s extension of the practice to all 
former officials expands the trend significantly and threatens to un-
ravel the FSIA. The FSIA was designed to “free the Government 
from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing 
standards, and to ‘[assure] litigants that . . . decisions are made on 
purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due proc-
ess.’”34 Matar’s approach to immunity for former state officials flies 
in the face of these goals, and it does so unnecessarily. As we have 
shown, courts can reach the legally correct conclusion that former 
officials receive immunity for their official state acts through a natu-
ral application of the term “foreign state” in the FSIA, without man-
gling the “agency or instrumentality” definition and without return-
ing to the regime of executive discretion that the FSIA was designed 
to eliminate.  
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND IMMUNITY 
he final issue is whether there is anything special about human 
rights litigation that would exempt it from the considerations 
discussed above. As an initial matter, nothing in the statutes that 
serve as the basis for human rights litigation overrides immunity. 
The Supreme Court in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corp. held that the primary fount of U.S. human rights litigation, 
the ATS, is subject to the FSIA’s immunity restrictions.35 The Tor-
                                                                                                
32 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004). 
33 See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625-27 (7th Cir. 2004). 
34 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1487, p. 7 (1976)). 
35 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
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ture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) is another basis for human 
rights litigation in U.S. courts. This statute, enacted in 1992, pro-
vides a cause of action for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing 
committed under color of foreign law.36 Like the ATS, the TVPA 
does not mention immunity. This omission is significant, since the 
TVPA was enacted against the backdrop of both the FSIA and the 
Amerada Hess decision. Statements in the legislative history of the 
TVPA confirm that the statute is subject to the immunity restric-
tions in the FSIA.37 
Plaintiffs in human rights cases have sometimes argued for an 
exception to the FSIA for violations of “jus cogens” norms of inter-
national law. A jus cogens norm is the highest norm in international 
law from which no derogation is permitted.38 Frequently cited ex-
amples are the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture. In 
suits brought directly against foreign states, every circuit to have 
considered the issue has concluded that immunity is available even 
for alleged jus cogens violations.39  
These jus cogens decisions implicitly or expressly assume that 
human rights violations can be official acts for purposes of the FSIA. 
                                                                                                
36 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.  
37 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88 
(“The TVPA is subject to restrictions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976.”); S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991) (“[T]he TVPA is not meant to over-
ride the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.”). There is a statement in the 
legislative history suggesting an expectation that, because the TVPA authorizes 
suits only against individuals rather than states, “sovereign immunity would not 
generally be an available defense.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 5. There is also a 
statement, however, suggesting that even former officials might be able to invoke 
the immunity protections of the FSIA in a suit brought under the TVPA if they 
“could prove an agency relationship to a state.” S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 8. 
38 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
39 See Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1150-53 (7th Cir. 
2001); Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242-45 
(2d Cir. 1996); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 
719 (9th Cir. 1992).  
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This assumption is further supported by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, which stated in the context of examin-
ing the FSIA’s commercial activities exception that police abuse and 
torture were “peculiarly sovereign in nature.”40 It is also supported 
by the international law of state immunity. As a general matter, the 
international law of state immunity applies even when a state offi-
cial acts illegally or in excess of authority.41 Moreover, most na-
tional courts to address the issue have concluded that, under inter-
national law, sovereign immunity is appropriate in civil cases even 
for alleged violations of jus cogens norms.42 
U.S. courts have not resolved a related issue, which is the extent 
to which the acts of state officers that violate foreign domestic law 
can constitute official state action for purposes of the FSIA. Some 
courts view the foreign state’s position on whether the officer acted 
in an official capacity to be an important factor in answering this 
question,43 a sensible approach in light of the difficulties courts 
would otherwise have in discerning the contours of foreign public 
law. It is also worth keeping in mind that the ultimate issue for pur-
                                                                                                
40 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) 
41 See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at 6 (collecting citations). 
42 See Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 (Canada); Anotato Eidiko Dikasterio, 
6/2002, excerpted and translated in Maria Panezi, Sovereign Immunity and Violation of 
Jus Cogens Norms, 56 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 199 (2003) 
(Greece); Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] 
UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (United Kingdom); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 
(2001) 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273 (European Court of Human Rights). Some Italian 
decisions contain contrary reasoning, see, e.g., Ferrini v. Germany, Cass. sez. 
un., 6 Nov. 2003, n.5044, ILDC 19 (IT 2004), but they involve abuses commit-
ted within Italy and thus are distinguishable from most U.S. international human 
rights cases. In any event, Italy is an outlier, and its approach is under challenge 
by Germany in the International Court of Justice. See Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State (F.R.G. v. Italy) (I.C.J. filed Dec. 23, 2008). 
43 Compare Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human 
Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (no immunity when Phil-
ippine government said defendant’s action was not official), with Belhas, 515 F.3d 
at 1283 (immunity after Israel said defendant’s action was official). But see Yousuf, 
552 F.3d at 377 (foreign government said action was official but no immunity 
granted). 
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poses of immunity in this context is whether the action in question 
is the conduct of the state, a question of attribution. Under interna-
tional law, the state is internationally responsible for the official’s 
actions, even if the official exceeded his authority or contravened 
his instructions, as long as he acted “with apparent authority.”44 As a 
result, international law “does not require, as a condition of a state’s 
entitlement to claim immunity for the conduct of its servant or 
agent, that the latter should have been acting in accordance with his 
instructions or authority.”45  
CONCLUSION 
e have argued that the FSIA should be construed to confer 
presumptive immunity in lawsuits brought against foreign 
officials for their official acts. This conclusion, if accepted, would 
narrow the scope of human rights litigation in U.S. courts. It would 
not, however, affect the many other legitimate mechanisms of hu-
man rights accountability. For example, a nation can hold its offi-
cials accountable in its own courts. It can waive an official’s immu-
nity in foreign courts.46 It can ratify a treaty that criminalizes acts in 
such a way that it may eliminate state immunities in foreign 
courts.47 It can agree by treaty (or through the UN Security Coun-
cil) to an international tribunal, such as the International Criminal 
Court, that abrogates state immunities.  
These widely accepted mechanisms of human rights accountabil-
ity are consistent with the international law of state immunity be-
cause they are all grounded in state consent. By contrast, human 
                                                                                                
44 See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at para. 12 (quoting Interna-
tional Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, Article 7, commentary, and other sources).  
45 See id.  
46 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700 (Under Seal), 817 F.2d 1108, 
1110-11 (9th Cir. 1987). 
47 See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at paras. 19, 71 (explaining 
the central holding in Pinochet). But cf. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121, at para. 58 (Feb. 14) 
(implicitly questioning the reasoning in Pinochet). 
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rights accountability via civil lawsuits directed at foreign officials for 
their conduct abroad has no basis in any treaty or any other act of 
state consent. Such an approach to accountability, though adopted 
by some lower courts in the United States, has “not attracted the 
approbation of states generally.”48 It is also, according to the British 
House of Lords, “contrary to customary international law.”49 Con-
gress could nevertheless decide to endorse such an approach, but it 





                                                                                                
48 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note 47, Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, at para. 48.  
49 See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at para. 99. 
